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ARTICLES

INDEMNIFICATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE
TO NULLIFICATION
Robert A. Mikos*

The federalization of criminal law arguably poses a threat to the states’
traditional police powers.1 Congress has created thousands of distinct federal crimes,2 and the “amount of individual citizen behavior now potentially
subject to federal criminal control has increased in astonishing proportions
in the last few decades.”3 Though not all of these federal criminal statutes
necessarily upset the careful regulatory choices the states have made, many
of them likely do. For example, Congress has criminalized activities the
states now permit; it has denied federal criminal defendants many of the
special procedural rights they would enjoy if prosecuted in state criminal
justice systems; and it has imposed punishments on convicted offenders that
* Professor of Law and Director of the Program in Law and Government, Vanderbilt University
Law School (robert.mikos@vanderbilt.edu). I want to thank the editors of the Montana Law Review for
organizing the 2014 Browning Symposium on the Future of Federalism, an event for which this Essay
was prepared. I also want to thank Nancy King and Christopher Slobogin for helpful comments and
Mark Day and Alex Nourafshan for diligent research assistance.
1. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the “[s]tates possess primary authority for
defining and enforcing the criminal law.” Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982); see also Bond v.
U.S., 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2089 (2014) (“Perhaps the clearest example of traditional state authority is the
punishment of local criminal activity.”).
2. See Task Force on the Federalization of Criminal Law, The Federalization of Criminal Law 9 n.
11 http://perma.cc/MFH9-P3KP (http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminaljustice/Federalization_of_Criminal_Law.authcheckdam.pdf) (ABA 1998) [hereinafter Task Force Report]
(acknowledging the difficulty posed by tallying the number of distinct federal crimes but suggesting that
3,000 might be a lower bound estimate); Susan R. Klein & Ingrid B. Grobey, Debunking Claims of
Over-Federalization of Criminal Law, 62 Emory L.J. 1, 3 (2012) (suggesting there are 4,500 federal
criminal laws).
3. Task Force Report, supra n. 2, at 10.
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vary both in degree and kind from the punishments imposed by state law for
comparable offenses.4 In many instances, Congress’s decision to supplant
the policy choices made by the states seems unjustified by any legitimate
federal interest.5
The conventional wisdom suggests there is very little the states themselves can do to stop the federalization of criminal law and the resultant
diminution of state prerogatives. The states, of course, have no authority to
nullify federal law, nor can they interfere with the enforcement of federal
law. At most, the states can petition the federal courts, Congress, and the
President to respect state authority, but it seems unlikely they will find a
receptive audience in any of the three branches of the national government.
The federal courts have done little to stem the tide of federalization; Congress lacks the incentive to abstain from criminal legislation and has repeatedly passed over proposals to comprehensively reform federal criminal law;
and while the President has discouraged enforcement of certain federal
criminal statutes, the President’s willingness and ability to do so are limited
in important respects.6
But the conventional wisdom has overlooked a tactic that the states
could adopt—and at least once did adopt—to take some of the bite out of
federal criminal laws they deem objectionable. Namely, the states could
indemnify the legal expenses of residents caught in the crosshairs of federal
law enforcement agents. Indemnification could lessen the federal government’s appetite for and success at enforcing certain federal criminal laws. It
is no panacea, of course, for there is nothing the states can do to eliminate
the threat of objectionable federal prosecutions. But indemnification might
help to blunt the impact of federal criminal laws and thereby restore some
of the prerogatives the states have lost in the criminal justice realm.
Indemnifying the legal costs of persons facing legal actions instigated
by another sovereign is not without precedent.7 Congress, for example, currently helps to pay for legal representation of convicted offenders in some
state clemency proceedings.8 And the states once returned the favor. Some
northern states provided counsel for alleged runaway slaves facing legal
4. See infra Part I.
5. For a discussion of Congress’s motivations in passing criminal legislation, see infra notes 17
and 65–68 and accompanying text.
6. See infra Part I.
7. Private organizations have also helped to subsidize the legal costs of criminal defendants. For
example, Koch Industries recently announced that it had awarded a grant to the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers to help train defense lawyers for indigent defendants throughout the country.
See Press Release from Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Def. Lawyers, NACDL Selected to Receive Significant
Grant from Koch Industries, Inc. to Address Nation’s Profound Indigent Defense Crisis http://perma.cc/
G6KK-V75D (http://www.nacdl.org/NewsReleases.aspx?id=34848) (Oct. 21, 2014).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 3599 (2012); Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180 (2009) (holding that § 3599 authorizes federal payment of legal representation for defendants in state clemency proceedings).
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proceedings under the federal Fugitive Slave Act.9 Similarly, states commonly submit amicus briefs on behalf of defendants facing federal criminal
charges. In United States v. Lopez,10 for example, the National Conference
of State Legislatures filed a brief on behalf of Alfonso Lopez urging the
Supreme Court to narrow Congress’s authority to legislate in the criminal
law domain.11
This Essay briefly discusses how and why state indemnification could
help protect state prerogatives across a variety of issues ranging from marijuana to abortion to gambling to firearms.
I. BACKGROUND
The rise of federal criminal law in the past few decades has eroded the
states’ long-standing control over the domain.12 At present count, Congress
has created more than 4,500 federal crimes.13 Many of these federal crimes
address legitimate federal concerns—think of laws proscribing inter-state
smuggling of cigarettes, the assassination of federal officials, or counterfeiting of U.S. currency—and thus pose little threat to the proper balance of the
federal system. But many federal criminal laws seem only loosely connected to any recognized federal interest—think of laws proscribing robbery,14 arson,15 or even simple possession of drugs.16 Such laws seem more
geared toward protecting the health, safety, and morals of the population—
concerns more traditionally the purview of the states—than protecting the
9. See Stanley W. Campbell, The Slave Catchers: Enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law,
1850–1860 181 (U. of N.C. Press 1970). To be sure, it is not clear whether state indemnification covered
the costs of representation in federal FSA proceedings or was limited only to state proceedings. The
Supreme Court held those state proceedings, which were designed to thwart enforcement of the FSA,
invalid in Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506 (1858), discussed infra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
10. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
11. Br. of the Nat’l Conf. of St. Legis., Nat’l Governors’ Ass’n, Nat’l League of Cities, Nat’l Ass’n
of Cos., Int’l City/Co. Mgt. Ass’n, and Nat’l Inst. of Mun. Law Officers, Joined by the Nat’l Sch. Bds.
Ass’n, as Amici Curiae in Support of Respt., U.S. v. Lopez, 1994 WL 16007619 (No. 93-1260, 514 U.S.
549 (1994)).
12. E.g. Task Force Report, supra n. 2, at 43 (arguing that federalization threatens to undermine
“the careful decentralization of criminal law authority that has worked well for all of our constitutional
history”). But see Klein & Grobey, supra n. 2 (arguing that the passage of federal criminal statutes
standing alone does not necessarily undermine state prerogatives, since many federal statutes are seldom
enforced). For a helpful bibliography of commentaries discussing the federalization of criminal law, see
id. at nn. 1–9.
13. See Klein & Grobey, supra n. 2, at 3.
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (“Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce . . .
by robbery or extortion . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or
both.”).
15. Id. at § 844(i) (making it a federal crime to destroy by means of “fire . . . any property used in
interstate . . . commerce or in any activity affecting interstate commerce”).
16. 21 U.S.C. § 844 (“It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a
controlled substance.”).
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flow of interstate commerce, the functioning of the federal government, the
value of federal currency, or some other legitimate federal interest.17
To be sure, the federal government’s encroachment on the states’ traditional police powers is not entirely harmful to the states. After all, with
more than 100,000 law enforcement agents and 4,000 prosecutors in its
employ,18 the federal government can help states shoulder some of the financial burden of combating crime. But the states do not always welcome
federal assistance, especially when state and federal laws diverge, as they
commonly do.
First, and perhaps most importantly, federal law proscribes some activities that the states allow. The distribution and possession of marijuana is
just one example.19 As of this writing, more than twenty states have legalized marijuana for medical or even recreational purposes.20 To these states,
marijuana has the potential to alleviate the suffering of some residents—or
the budgetary woes of state lawmakers.21 Yet the federal government continues to ban marijuana outright, and federal law enforcement agents have
brought criminal prosecutions and forfeiture proceedings against persons
the states treat more like prophets than pariahs.22 There is a similar gap
between federal and state law governing other activities as well, including

17. See e.g. Task Force Report, supra n. 2, at 55 (lamenting that much of the federal criminal law
has been enacted “in the absence of a demonstrated and distinctive federal justification”).
Numerous commentators attribute the passage of federal criminal legislation to a desire to appear to
constituents as “tough on crime.” E.g. John S. Baker, Jr., U.S. v. Morrison and Other Arguments Against
Federal “Hate Crime” Legislation, 80 B.U. L. Rev. 1191, 1193–1194 (2000); Sara Sun Beale, Reporter’s Draft for the Working Group on Principles to Use When Considering the Federalization of
Criminal Law, 46 Hastings L.J. 1277, 1293 (1995); Guido Calabresi, Federal and State Courts: Restoring a Workable Balance, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1293, 1296 (2003); Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial
Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines: A Case Study in Controlling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
893, 924–925 (2000) (surmising that “ ‘deadbeat dads,’ wife-beaters, and drug dealers do not have particularly powerful Washington lobbies, and many federalization projects therefore encounter little or no
political resistance.”).
18. See Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 1421, 1464 (2009) (“The federal government employs about 105,000 law enforcement agents.”) [hereinafter Mikos, On the Limits of
Supremacy].
19. See id. at 1425–1426 (discussing other examples where state and federal criminal laws starkly
diverge).
20. Governing.com, State Marijuana Laws Map http://perma.cc/Y8NF-H4ZJ (http://
www.governing.com/gov-data/state-marijuana-laws-map-medical-recreational.html) (accessed Jan. 20,
2015) (detailing marijuana legalization in the states).
21. Robert A. Mikos, State Taxation of Marijuana Distribution and Other Federal Crimes, 2010 U.
Chi. Leg. F. 222, 222–223 (explaining that promises of new tax revenue have helped fuel the drive for
marijuana legalization in the states).
22. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy, supra n. 18, at 1433 (discussing federal government’s
rejection of claims that marijuana has medical value).
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the possession of firearms,23 the provision of abortion procedures,24 and
gambling on sporting events,25 to name a few.
In each of these cases, federal criminal law threatens to displace state
policy choices and undermine the values commonly attributed to federalism. The concern is that federal criminal bans will discourage people from
engaging in behaviors the states support—the use of marijuana for medical
purposes, the possession of certain firearms, the provision of controversial
abortion services, and gambling on sporting events (particularly in tax-paying casinos). To be sure, this will not always happen—some federal bans
lack teeth, even if they look tough on paper. The federal ban on medical
marijuana is a good example. The federal government simply does not have
the resources needed to effectively crack down on use of this drug (for
medical or other purposes).26 But even when these federal laws fail to discourage most instances of a prohibited behavior, they are not wholly irrelevant. For example, until very recently, the federal government continued to
enforce its marijuana ban against persons who were, arguably, acting within
the limits of state law,27and in the process, likely deterred at least some
people from taking advantage of the protections afforded by state law.
Second, federal law sometimes affords persons facing investigation
and criminal prosecution weaker procedural protections.28 The U.S. Consti23. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, State Laws and Published Ordinances–Firearms
(31st ed. 2011) (compiling state laws pertaining to firearms, including state laws that do not ban the
possession and transfer of certain machine guns proscribed by federal law).
24. See Guttmacher Institute, State Policies in Brief: Bans on “Partial-Birth” Abortion, http://
perma.cc/9G89-XS9J(http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_BPBA.pdf) (Dec. 1, 2014)
(comparing and contrasting state and federal policy toward partial birth abortion procedures).
25. See e.g. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Gov. of N.J., 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013) (discussing
the conflict between New Jersey’s Sports Wagering Law and the federal Professional and Amateur
Sports Protection Act).
26. See Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy, supra n. 18, at 1424 (“[T]he federal government lacks
the resources needed to enforce its own [marijuana] ban vigorously”).
27. See Robert A. Mikos, Medical Marijuana and the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 89 Denv.
U. L. Rev. 997, 1008 (2012) (“[S]ome individuals have been and will continue to be prosecuted under
the federal [marijuana] ban. To the extent the federal ban represents a usurpation of state power, these
prosecutions will seem unjust in our constitutional system. And even if they are infrequent, the prosecutions may seem all the more arbitrary and unjust due to their infrequency.”). Recent spending legislation
may have put an end to federal enforcement efforts, at least temporarily. See Pub. L. No. 113-235, 128
Stat. 2130 § 538 (2014) (the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015. Instructing
that “[n]one of the funds made available in this Act to the Department of Justice may be used . . . to
prevent . . . States from implementing their own State laws that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana”).
28. See Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 643, 647–648 (1997) (“Because of differences between federal and state criminal justice systems,
an offender will often fare worse if prosecuted in federal court rather than state court. He may be
detained pending trial when he would have been released if charged in state court, denied discovery
allowable in state court, and confronted with evidence that would have been suppressed in state court. If
convicted, a federally prosecuted defendant is likely to receive a longer sentence and to serve far more
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tution, of course, sets limits on investigative and prosecutorial tactics that
both federal and state law enforcement officials must abide—no coerced
confessions, no warrantless searches, and so on. But state constitutions
commonly go beyond the minimum protections required by the federal constitution.29 For example, some states prohibit their own law enforcement
agencies from using electronic recordings even when otherwise permitted
by the U.S. Constitution, demonstrating a greater respect for privacy than is
shown by the U.S. Constitution.30 But the same rules do not govern federal
law enforcement agencies,31 for whom wiretapping has seemingly become
standard practice in certain types of criminal investigation, notwithstanding
the obvious privacy concerns raised thereby.32 Hence, even when federal
and state law are substantively identical—i.e., they prohibit the same conduct—federal law can undermine important policy choices made by the
states concerning the way such crimes should be investigated and prosecuted.
Third, federal law commonly imposes harsher punishments on crimes
than are provided for by state law. That is, a suspect who could be charged
with violating identical state and federal criminal laws might face a tougher
sentence if prosecuted and convicted under the latter.33 A state might object
to the nature or severity of federal sanctions in a given case, even if it does
of that sentence than he would if sentenced in state court.”) (internal citations omitted); Julie R.
O’Sullivan, The Federal Criminal ‘Code’ is a Disgrace: Obstruction Statutes as Case Study, 96 J. Crim.
L. & Criminology 643, 643–648 (2006).
29. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977); James W. Diehm, New Federalism and Constitutional Criminal Procedure:
Are We Repeating the Mistakes of the Past? 55 Md. L. Rev. 223 (1996).
30. E.g. Vt. v. Geraw, 795 A.2d 1219 (Vt. 2002) (barring police from using surreptitious recording
made in defendant’s home).
31. See Randall T. Shepard, In a Federal Case, Is the State Constitution Something Important or
Just Another Piece of Paper? 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1437, 1445 (2005) (“The nearly universal
conclusion of federal courts is that violations of a defendant’s state constitutional rights are irrelevant if
the defendant is charged in a federal forum.”); see also John. B. Corr, State Searches, Federal Cases,
and Choice of Law: Just a Little Respect, 23 Pepp. L. Rev. 31, 34 (1995); Kenneth J. Melilli, Exclusion
of Evidence in Federal Prosecutions on the Basis of State Law, 22 Ga. L. Rev. 667, n. 182 (1988)
(surveying cases in which federal courts have admitted evidence seized illegally under state law).
32. For data on the number of wiretap requests made by federal law enforcement agents, see Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Wiretap Report 2013, http://perma.cc/SC6M-KJXV (http://
www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/WiretapReports/wiretap-report-2013.aspx) (accessed Nov. 16, 2014) (reporting that federal judges had authorized 1,476 wiretaps in 2013). To be sure, many states also employ
wiretaps. The Administrative Office, for example, reports that state judges authorized 2,100 wiretaps in
2013. Id. But over half of those authorizations—1,103—came from two states (California and New
York). Id. at Table 1. Moreover, it appears that six states have not even authorized wiretaps for use in
criminal investigations and another seventeen states did not utilize such authority during 2013 (or at
least, had not reported doing so). Id.
33. Michael M. O’Hear, National Uniformity/Local Uniformity: Reconsidering the Use of Departures to Reduce Federal-State Sentencing Disparities, 87 Iowa L. Rev. 721 (2002); Stephen F. Smith,
Proportionality and Federalism, 91 Va. L. Rev. 879 (2000).
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not object (per se) to punishing the defendant. United States v. Pleau34 illustrates the point. Jason Pleau was indicted by federal authorities for the
robbery and murder of a gas station manager in Woonsocket, Rhode Island.35 Under federal law, Pleau could have faced the death penalty. At the
time of the indictment, however, Pleau was in state custody, so the federal
government had to request that Rhode Island hand him over—and the Governor of Rhode Island adamantly refused. Pleau was hardly a sympathetic
character—he was already serving an eighteen-year state sentence on unrelated charges––but the Governor resisted the federal government’s demand
because the state of Rhode Island opposes the death penalty. He wanted
assurances from the Attorney General that Pleau would not be executed
(assurances the federal government was at the time unwilling to give).36
Justice Kennedy has cogently explained how federal criminal law can
undermine the values of federalism, even when the state and federal governments agree that a given behavior is undesirable and should be discouraged.
In Lopez, the case challenging the federal government’s ban on gun possession on school grounds, he opined:
While it is doubtful that any State, or indeed any reasonable person, would
argue that it is wise policy to allow students to carry guns on school premises,
considerable disagreement exists about how best to accomplish that goal. In
this circumstance, the theory and utility of our federalism are revealed, for the
States may perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to devise
various solutions where the best solution is far from clear.
If a State or municipality determines that harsh criminal sanctions are necessary and wise to deter students from carrying guns on school premises, the
reserved powers of the States are sufficient to enact those measures. Indeed,
over 40 States already have criminal laws outlawing the possession of firearms on or near school grounds.
Other, more practicable means to rid the schools of guns may be thought by
the citizens of some States to be preferable for the safety and welfare of the
schools those States are charged with maintaining. These might include inducements to inform on violators where the information leads to arrests or
confiscation of the guns, programs to encourage the voluntary surrender of
guns with some provision for amnesty, penalties imposed on parents or guardians for failure to supervise the child, laws providing for suspension or expulsion of gun-toting students, or programs for expulsion with assignment to
special facilities.

34. 680 F. 3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012).
35. Id. at 3.
36. Id.
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The statute now before us forecloses the States from experimenting and exercising their own judgment in an area to which States lay claim by right of
history and expertise . . . .37

Although states have ample reasons to object to the federalization of criminal law, it is commonly thought that there is nothing they can do to stop the
phenomenon. Most importantly, it is settled wisdom that states cannot nullify federal law. Nullification is the
theory that each individual state is fully “sovereign” and as such the final
judge of its own constitutional rights and obligations; that consequently it
may legitimately rule that any federal act—law, regulation, judicial decision,
executive action, or treaty—is unconstitutional; and, most important, that it
may act on this judgment by blocking the implementation of that federal act
within the state’s boundaries.38

Almost since the Framing, states have attempted to nullify objectionable
federal laws by declaring them void within their own jurisdictions and by
threatening to block their enforcement through various means (say, by
hanging federal law enforcement agents).39 But nullification flies in the face
of express federal supremacy,40 not to mention common sense, and has
been rightly been dismissed and derided by the Supreme Court,41 (most)
politicians,42 and scholars alike.43 Notably, even the head of the Cato Institute rejects the theory of nullification44—a clear indication of just how far
from mainstream the theory of nullification strays.
37. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581–582 (Kennedy & O’Connor, JJ., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
38. James H. Read & Neal Allen, Living, Dead, and Undead: Nullification Past and Present, 1 Am.
Political Thought 263, 268 (U. Chi. Press 2012).
39. Id. at 278–292 (discussing historical episodes of nullification); Sanford Levinson, The TwentyFirst Century Rediscovery of Nullification and Secession in American Political Rhetoric: Frivolousness
Incarnate or Serious Arguments To Be Wrestled With? 67 Ark. L. Rev. 17, 36–49 (2014).
40. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
41. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (denouncing state attempts to nullify the Supreme Court’s
holding in Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
42. E.g. Ernest A. Young, Modern-Day Nullification, 65 Case W. Res. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming
2015) (discussing President Jackson’s denouncement of South Carolina nullification resolutions) (on
file with author).
43. E.g. Levinson, supra n. 39, at 31–32 (“If we are full-throated Holmesians, then we can say with
absolute confidence that any suggestion of so-called ‘sovereign states’ having the power to ‘nullify’
federal law is utter nonsense. No federal judge (or, for that matter, all but the most deviant state counterpart) is going to uphold state authority against the Supremacy Clause in Article VI, which clearly and
unequivocally gives all laws passed pursuant to the Constitution the power to negate any state laws—or,
indeed, state constitutions—to the contrary.”); Read & Allen, supra n. 38, at 268 (“Nullification finds
little support in either constitutional text or the framers’ intentions, but the same might be said about
many other constitutional doctrines (including some embraced by the court at one time or another.”)).
44. Robert A. Levy, N.Y. Times, The Limits of Nullification, http://perma.cc/X35S-4YWT (http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/09/04/opinion/the-limits-of-nullification.html) (Sept. 4, 2013) (“[W]hile states
are not powerless in the face of federal law, there are limits to what they can do to prevent enforcement
of constitutionally valid regulation.”).
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A logical corollary is that the states also may not interfere with federal
investigations or prosecutions. Two notable cases illustrate the point. In
Ableman v. Booth,45 the Supreme Court invalidated a writ issued by a Wisconsin state court that ordered a federal court to release a prisoner being
held under the federal Fugitive Slave Act, finding that state courts had no
such authority over federal officials.46 And in United States v. Pleau, discussed above, the First Circuit ordered the Rhode Island Governor to hand
his prisoner over to federal authorities for trial, opining that “[s]tate interposition to defeat federal authority vanished with the Civil War.”47
Because states have no authority to block federal law, their only remaining option is to persuade the federal courts, the President, or Congress
to stop the federalization of criminal law. But none of these three pillars of
the federal government has proven a receptive audience to their pleas. The
federal courts have not put much of a dent in Congress’s constitutional authority to enact federal criminal legislation. In Lopez, of course, the Court
did find that Congress had exceeded its constitutional authority when it
adopted a federal ban on the simple possession of firearms on school
grounds.48 And in United States v. Morrison,49 the Court similarly found
Congress had exceeded its authority by creating a federal tort cause of action to redress gender-motivated violence.50 But the feat accomplished in
Lopez (1995) and Morrison (2000) has not been repeated since. Indeed,
Gonzales v. Raich51 presented a prime opportunity to extend Lopez’s holding and further limit federal criminal law, but the Court balked; instead, it
upheld Congress’s power to ban the possession, cultivation, and distribution
of marijuana, even when those activities take place entirely within one
state.52 Indeed, Professor Michael Simons has bluntly surmised that “the
Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence over the past one hundred years has left the judiciary largely powerless to control federalization.”53
To be sure, the federal courts have shown more willingness to limit the
reach of federal criminal law via statutory interpretation. In Jones v. United
States,54 for example, the Supreme Court interpreted the federal arson statute not to reach the destruction of an owner-occupied residence.55 Noting
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

62 U.S. 506 (1858).
Id. at 525–526.
Pleau, 680 F.3d at 6.
514 U.S. at 552.
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
Id. at 626–627.
545 U.S. 1 (2005).
Id. at 33.
Simons, supra n. 217, at 919.
529 U.S. 848 (2000).
Id.
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that its ruling in Lopez had raised some doubts about the constitutionality of
applying the federal arson statute to such facts, the Court decided to avoid
those doubts by reading the statute narrowly (i.e., not to cover the facts of
the case at hand).56 Likewise, in Bond v. United States,57 the Court narrowly construed the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of
1998 to avoid constitutional doubts about Congress’s ability to proscribe
assaults stemming from a love-triangle.58 There are other decisions in the
same mold,59 but all told these decisions still leave thousands of broad federal criminal provisions largely untouched, including federal laws banning
gambling on sports,60 possessing or distributing marijuana,61 possessing
machineguns,62 providing certain abortion procedures,63 and so on.64
For its part, Congress has seldom sought to repeal or narrow the reach
of federal criminal law, to harmonize federal and state criminal procedure,
or to reduce the disparities in federal and state criminal sentences. It has
repeatedly passed over proposals to comprehensively reform federal criminal law.65 And it has even eschewed more modest reforms targeted at particular federal criminal statutes. For example, members of Congress have
56. Id. at 848–849.
57. 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
58. Id. at 2081–2082.
59. E.g. U.S. v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349–350 (1971) (suggesting that the Court “will not be quick to
assume that Congress has meant to effect a significant change in the sensitive relation between federal
and state criminal jurisdiction”).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 3702 makes it a federal crime for:
(1) a governmental entity to sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law
or compact, or
(2) a person to sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote, pursuant to the law or compact of a
governmental entity, a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme
based, directly or indirectly (through the use of geographical references or otherwise), on one
or more competitive games in which amateur or professional athletes participate, or are intended to participate, or on one or more performances of such athletes in such games.
61. 21 U.S.C § 841 (“[I]t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally . . . to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.”); 21 U.S.C. § 844 (“It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to
possess a controlled substance.”).
62. 18. U.S.C. § 922 (o)(1) & (o)(2)(B) (“[I]t shall be unlawful for any person to transfer or possession a machinegun” except a machinegun “that was lawfully possessed before the date this subsection
takes effect.”).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (“Any physician who, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce,
knowingly performs a partial-birth abortion and thereby kills a human fetus shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both.”).
64. For commentary on other broad federal criminal statutes that have escaped judicial scrutiny
largely unscathed, see e.g. Richard Garnett, The New Federalism, the Spending Power, and Federal
Criminal Law, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (2003) (criticizing Congress’s invocation of the spending power to
federalize run-of-the mill bribery cases).
65. See generally Ronald L. Gainer, Federal Criminal Code Reform: Past and Future, 2 Buff.
Crim. L. Rev. 45 (1998) (detailing prior failed attempts to reform federal criminal law and the obstacles
confronting reform proposals).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol76/iss1/4

10

Mikos: Indemnification as an Alternative to Nullification
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\76-1\MON104.txt

2015

unknown

INDEMNIFICATION

Seq: 11

25-MAR-15

13:54

67

recently introduced a variety of measures designed to limit the federal marijuana ban, but none seems likely to pass anytime in the near future.66 Instead, Congress appears content to temporarily bar the Department of Justice (DOJ) from using funds to prevent the states from implementing their
medical marijuana laws (whatever that might mean).67 In any event, as a
practical matter, Congress might be unable to draft narrower statutes that
serve legitimate federal interests. As Professor Simons explains, “[e]ven
when a new federal law is justified by a legitimate need for federal intervention—for example, a demonstrated state failure to combat extensive organized crime—the law itself is likely to cover far more than the specific
undesirable conduct to which the statute is directed.”68
That leaves the President. As the nation’s Chief Executive, the President too can play a role in safeguarding state prerogatives from federal encroachment.69 The President must decide how to allocate limited federal
law enforcement resources. In so doing, the President could prioritize cases
that trigger legitimate and substantial federal interests and de-emphasize
cases that implicate countervailing state interests. Indeed, the DOJ has issued several memoranda to United States Attorneys urging them not to expend federal resources pursuing legal action against marijuana users and
traffickers who are acting in compliance with state law and who do not
otherwise implicate defined federal interests.70
66. N.Y. Times Editorial Bd., Repeal Prohibition, Again, http://perma.cc/A8KK-M2RK (http://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/07/27/opinion/sunday/high-time-marijuana-legalization.html) (Jul.
27, 2014) (urging Congress to legalize marijuana, but acknowledging that “this Congress is as unlikely
to take action on marijuana as it has been on other big issues”).
67. See Pub. L. No. 113-235, 128 Stat. 2130, § 538 (2014) (the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015. Instructing that “[n]one of the funds made available in this Act to the
Department of Justice may be used . . . to prevent . . . States from implementing their own State laws
that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana”). For an insightful
discussion of Congress’s power over the Executive Branch’s allocation of enforcement resources, see
Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 44
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 757 (1999).
68. Simons, supra n. 17, at 929.
69. See Mikos, supra n. 27, at 1006–1009 (explaining how the exercise of federal enforcement
discretion could help protect state prerogatives in the criminal law realm); David S. Schwartz, Presidential Politics as a Safeguard of Federalism: The Case of Marijuana Legalization, 62 Buff. L. Rev. 599,
601 (2014) (arguing that “presidential electoral politics—the strategic and tactical decisions that presidential aspirants make to win critical swing state electoral votes in closely-contested presidential elections—can under certain conditions provide powerful protection to federalism”); Simons, supra n. 17, at
930 (“Of the three branches of government, the Executive Branch is the best equipped to control federalization.”).
70. For the latest memorandum, see Memo. from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General, to All
United States Attorneys, Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement (Aug. 29, 2013) (available at
http://perma.cc/KA8G-WV98 (http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467
.pdf)). The latest memo appears to address some of the shortcomings of previous enforcement memoranda, discussed in Robert A. Mikos, A Critical Appraisal of the Department of Justice’s New Approach
to Medical Marijuana, 22 Stan. L. & Policy Rev. 633 (2011).
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But the President’s ability to protect the states by channeling the enforcement of federal criminal law is limited. For one thing, such guidance
cannot stop a future President from changing course and re-emphasizing
enforcement of previously dormant federal criminal statutes; indeed, DOJ
guidance does not even bind the Administration that wrote it. As I have
explained elsewhere,
[A non-enforcement policy] does not create any legally enforceable rights that
a court could use to dismiss a criminal prosecution brought by non-conforming federal agents. [Moreover, such policy] will not necessarily deter
federal agents from pursuing such prosecutions, because the DOJ’s power to
detect and sanction non-compliance with its own policy is quite limited.71

In any event, the President seems least likely to issue such assurances of
non-enforcement when they are needed the most—namely, when the federal government most strongly disagrees with the way that a state is handling a given behavior. For all of these reasons, while non-enforcement
holds some promise for protecting state prerogatives against the federal
government, it is far from a panacea.
In sum, federal criminal law poses a threat to state prerogatives. The
states cannot address this threat by blocking the operation of federal law.
They must work within the constitutional architecture that makes the federal government supreme. But to date, they have had only limited success
petitioning the federal courts, Congress, and the President to limit the impact of federalization in the criminal law domain.
II. INDEMNIFICATION
So far, I have painted a fairly grim picture for the states. But I want to
propose a partial solution to the problems outlined above. Though my proposal is modest, it has the virtue of working within existing legal constraints—in other words, it would not require a revolutionary change in
federal law (constitutional or statutory) to be effective. Nor would my proposal require the active support of any of the three branches of the federal
government. In a nutshell, I propose that the states pay to vigorously defend
the targets of federal criminal prosecutions the states deem objectionable.72
In other words, the states would promise to indemnify the legal expenses of
residents they believe should not be investigated, indicted, or prosecuted by
the federal government.
To illustrate, a state could announce that it will pay all of the legal
expenses necessary to vigorously defend any resident who distributes medical marijuana in compliance with state law against any legal action brought
71. Mikos, supra n. 70, at 640.
72. States could not, of course, force any private citizen to accept the assistance, though one would
expect most citizens to do so.
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by the federal government stemming from such distribution. Such indemnification could cover the costs of legal representation at every stage of a
federal criminal case, including the costs of negotiating with federal prosecutors, filing evidentiary motions, screening potential jurors, hiring expert
witnesses, challenging the constitutionality of federal statutes, preparing
sentencing recommendations, filing appeals, and so on.
Indemnification could blunt the impact of federal criminal law in three
ways. First, in many cases, it would greatly increase the amount of resources that could be devoted to contesting federal charges. As it stands,
most criminal defendants in the federal system are represented by attorneys
provided by the federal government.73 These federal defenders do excellent
work, but they operate under increasingly tight budget constraints. For example, federal defenders are given only small allowances to cover the litany
of expenses that might be incurred in preparing a client’s case.74 Further,
recent federal budget cuts have only worsened these constraints75 and exacerbated the resource disparities that exist between federal defenders and
federal prosecutors.76
Though they are by no means guaranteed to do so, additional resources
provided by the state could generate better outcomes for criminal defend73. Radha Iyengar, An Analysis of the Performance of Federal Indigent Defense Counsel Table 1
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13187, June 2007).
All criminal defendants, of course, are entitled to effective assistance of counsel, whether or not
they can pay for it out of pocket. U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”); Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 669 (1984) (delineating standards for effective assistance of counsel). In the federal system,
indigent representation is provided by the federal public defender—attorneys employed by the federal
courts; by community organizations; or by panels of private attorneys appointed by the courts. See Id.
(discussing the different types of indigent defense in federal system and their performance).
74. The Criminal Justice Act (CJA) establishes the system for assigning and compensating attorneys who represent financially eligible defendants in federal criminal cases. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)–(e).
75. E.g. Donna Lee Elm & Richard S. Dellinger, Dismantling Gideon’s Legacy: Sequestration’s
Impact on Public Defender Services, 60 Fed. Law. 11, 11–12 (July 2013) (arguing that recent federal
budget cuts are “eviscerating the [federal defender] program”); Paul L. Friedman & Reggie B. Walton,
Public Defenders Offices Shouldn’t Suffer under Sequestration, Wash. Post (Apr. 18, 2013), http://
perma.cc/8SWR-WHQA (http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/public-defenders-offices-shouldntsuffer-under-sequestration/2013/04/18/c861b464-a619-11e2-a8e2-5b98cb59187f_story.html) (“Federal
public defender offices throughout the country stand to have their already tight budgets reduced significantly.”).
76. E.g. ABA, ABA President Rails against Budget Cuts to Federal Public Defender Program
(Aug. 23, 2013), http://perma.cc/BE3A-PSSV (http://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-newsarchives/2013/08/aba_president_rails.html) (“In our best day, in our best budget years, we are vastly
outgunned. . . . We do not have parity in our system.”) (quoting David Patton, Executive Director of the
Federal Defenders of New York); Dennis E. Curtis, Comment: Congressional Powers and Federal Judicial Burdens, 46 Hastings L.J. 1019, 1028 (1995) (“For the period 1979–1990, the percentage change in
direct expenditures for federal public defense purposes was 68.9%, while that for prosecution and legal
services was 470.4%. For the period covering 1985–1990, the respective percentages are 18.2% and
88.9%.”).
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ants.77 More specifically, as Professor Daryl Brown explains, “[p]arties
with greater resources can more thoroughly investigate and present evidence and challenge opposing evidence, and that changes outcomes.”78
Even in cases where the evidence against a defendant is overwhelming, a
well-funded defense team might still find opportunities to contest the prosecution, say, by filing non-frivolous motions challenging the constitutionality of federal legislation.
Second, and relatedly, indemnification could even discourage federal
officials from bringing some prosecutions in the first instance. Federal prosecutors simply cannot pursue “every alleged offense over which [f]ederal
jurisdiction exists.”79 This is one reason why they have “wide latitude in
determining when, whom, how, and even whether to prosecute for apparent
violations of [f]ederal criminal law.”80 In deciding which cases to bring, a
federal prosecutor might think twice before charging someone who has the
financial backing of the state, i.e., a case she knows will consume comparatively more of her own scarce resources.
Third, for persons who currently must pay for legal representation outof-pocket,81 indemnification will lessen the financial blow of being indicted
by the federal government. The costs of legal representation add to the effective sanction imposed for violations of the law, even though these costs
normally must be paid regardless of one’s guilt or innocence.
77. Justice Brennan recognized the “harsh reality that the quality of a criminal defendant’s representation frequently may turn on his ability to retain the best counsel money can buy.” Morris v. Slappy,
461 U.S. 1, 23 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring); see also James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How
Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make? The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes,
122 Yale L.J. 154, 159 (2012) (“Compared to appointed counsel, public defenders in Philadelphia reduce their clients’ murder conviction rate by 19%. They reduce the probability that their clients receive a
life sentence by 62%. Public defenders reduce overall expected time served in prison by 24%. These
results suggest that defense counsel makes an enormous difference in the outcomes of cases, even in the
most serious cases where one might hope that the particular type of defense lawyer would matter
least.”); Id. at 188 (“We find that, in general, appointed counsel have comparatively few resources, face
more difficult incentives, and are more isolated than public defenders.”); Ronald F. Wright, Parity of
Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice Theory, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 219, 221
(2004) (“Although there are genuine debates about the most efficient ways to organize criminal defense
work, money can improve any chosen method of delivering defense services.”).
78. Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 93 Cal. L. Rev. 1585, 1604 (2005).
79. U.S. Dep’t of Just., United States Attorneys’ Manual § 9-27.230(B)(1) (available at 1997 WL
1944702) (Jan. 1, 2009).
80. Id. at § 9-27.110(B).
81. A defendant qualifies for representation by the federal defender “if the person’s net financial
resources and income are insufficient to obtain qualified counsel.” Guide to Judiciary Policy: Defender
Services, vol. 7, ch. 2, § 210.40.30(a) (last revised Feb. 28, 2014) (available at http://perma.cc/J6LS4UJN (http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/AppointmentOfCounsel/CJAGuidelinesForms/vol7Part
A/vol7PartAChapter2.aspx#210_40)).
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For each of these reasons, indemnification against legal expenses
could mitigate the impact of federal criminal law. In other words, a resident
might prove more willing to flout federal law—say, by participating in a
state’s medical marijuana program—if she knows that the state will provide
her vigorous legal representation free of charge. To be sure, the resident
might be prosecuted, convicted, and punished anyway; but that risk will be
diminished—and perhaps greatly diminished—if the state throws its substantial weight behind her cause. For some defendants, the states’ beneficence might also lessen the stigma associated with being investigated, prosecuted, and even convicted by the federal government.82
Importantly, Congress likely could not stop states from subsidizing the
legal expenses of federal criminal defendants. Doing so would arguably run
afoul of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to choose her own representation.83 But a state presumably could not go beyond funding legal counsel,
experts, etc. For example, a state could not indemnify the fines imposed by
the federal government on convicted offenders. Indemnification of such
fines would almost certainly be preempted because it would encourage the
commission of federal offenses without simultaneously implicating a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. As Professor Miriam Baer explains, the
“strongest argument against insurance [against fines] will be the fear of
moral hazard. In other words, if insurance buffets the consequences of bad
behavior, insureds engage in more of that behavior.”84 To be sure, as I have
suggested, indemnification of legal expenses is also likely to encourage the
82. See Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy, supra n. 18, at 1478 (“[E]ven if they cannot shield
people from federal legal sanctions or change federal law in the short term, states can make people feel
secure from social sanctions by credibly signaling public approval of once taboo conduct.”).
83. See e.g. U.S. v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 55–56 (3d Cir. 1979) (“[T]he sixth amendment generally
protects a defendant’s decision to select a particular attorney to aid him in his efforts to cope with what
would otherwise be an incomprehensible and overpowering governmental authority. While the right to
select a particular person as counsel is not an absolute right, the arbitrary dismissal of a defendant’s
attorney of choice violates a defendant’s right to counsel.”); U.S. v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 357
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“A defendant is guaranteed also ‘the right to be represented by an otherwise qualified
attorney whom that defendant can afford to hire—in other words, to use his or her own assets to defend
the case, free of government regulation. Nor may the government interfere at will with a defendant’s
choice of counsel, as the Constitution ‘protect[s] . . . the defendant’s free choice independent of concern
for the objective fairness of the proceedings.’’ ”) (internal citations omitted).
84. Miriam Hechler Baer, Insuring Corporate Crime, 83 Ind. L.J. 1035, 1083 (2008); see also
Catherine M. Sharkey, Revisiting the Noninsurable Costs of Accidents, 64 Md. L. Rev. 409 (2005)
(discussing consensus view that insurance against criminal fines is against public policy); N.W. Nat’l
Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1962) (“Where a person is able to insure himself
against punishment he gains a freedom of misconduct inconsistent with the establishment of sanctions
against such misconduct. It is not disputed that insurance against criminal fines or penalties would be
void as violative of public policy. The same public policy should invalidate any contract of insurance
against the civil punishment that punitive damages represent.”); Tedesco v. Md. Cas. Co., 18 A.2d 357,
359 (Conn. 1941) (“A policy which permitted an insured to recover from the insurer fines imposed for a
violation of a criminal law would certainly be against public policy.”).
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flouting of federal law. But access to legal counsel, unlike access to funds
needed to pay fines, is a right protected by the Constitution. And courts that
have found it against public policy for an insurance company to indemnify
the costs of damages resulting from illegal or intentional conduct have
nonetheless allowed companies to indemnify the costs of defending against
allegations of such conduct.85
In addition to blunting the impact of federal criminal law, indemnification could also help spur compliance with state law. In the illustration
above, for example, the state has made indemnification contingent on the
marijuana supplier’s full compliance with state marijuana regulations. In
many states, this would mean the supplier would have to obtain a license
from the state, prevent sales to minors, and so on, to qualify for indemnification.86 To the extent such indemnification holds value to persons who
could face federal criminal prosecution, it would help entice them to comply with state law.
The provision of legal defense in federal cases will, of course, come at
a cost to the states. The states will have to budget funds for lawyers, experts, and so on to wage a vigorous and effective campaign. But requiring
states to have some skin in the game is not necessarily a bad thing. The
investment required should encourage states to focus their attention on the
federal cases that matter most and to avoid making disingenuous attacks on
federal law, a far too common phenomenon in the world of politics, where
talk is cheap. In any event, the states’ investments might pay for themselves. Some of the behaviors states could seek to encourage—say, the licensed distribution of marijuana—might generate tax revenues down the
road that would cover in part or whole the states’ indemnification policies.
In July 2014 alone, for example, Colorado collected nearly $8 million in tax
revenue from legalized marijuana.87
In short, providing indemnification of legal expenses could help to
mitigate the risks of federal legal actions the states find objectionable.

85. Burnham Shoes, Inc. v. W. Am. Ins. Co., 813 F.2d 328, 331 (11th Cir. 1987) (“[W]e fail to
perceive how requiring an insurer to meet its contractual obligation to provide a defense to claims
alleging intentional acts violates the public policy of this state.”).
86. E.g., 1 Colo. Code Regs. § 212-2 (2013) (detailing regulations governing retail marijuana distributors).
87. Christopher Ingraham, Colorado Marijuana Tax Revenues Surge as Recreational Sales Surpass
Medical for the First Time, Wash. Post: Workblog (Sept. 11, 2014), http://perma.cc/6E95-RJRF (http://
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/09/11/colorado-marijuana-tax-revenues-surge-asrecreational-sales-surpass-medical-for-the-first-time/).
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III. CONCLUSION
Nullification is a discredited tactic the states should disavow. But that
does not mean the states must sit idly by as the federal government asserts
control over the criminal justice system. To lessen the impact of the federalization of substantive criminal law, procedural criminal law, and sentencing
law, the states could indemnify the legal expenses of residents facing objectionable federal prosecutions. Such indemnification could help mitigate the
impact of federalization in a diverse array of substantive fields. Importantly,
it would not require the support of Congress, the President, or the federal
courts to be effective.
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